Threats to network security increase with growing volumes and velocity of data across networks, and they present challenges not only to law enforcement agencies, but to businesses, families and individuals. The volume, velocity and veracity of shared data across networks entail accurate and reliable automated tools for filtering out useful from malicious, noisy or irrelevant data. While data mining and machine learning techniques have widely been adopted within the network security community, challenges and gaps in knowledge extraction from data have remained due to insufficient data sources on attacks on which to test the algorithms accuracy and reliability. We propose a data-flow adaptive approach to intrusion detection based on high-dimensional cyberattacks data. The algorithm repeatedly takes random samples from an inherently bi-modal, highdimensional dataset of 82,332 observations on 25 numeric and two categorical variables. Its main idea is to capture subtle information resulting from reduced data dimension of a large number of malicious flows and by iteratively estimating roles played by individual variables in construction of key components. Data visualization and numerical results provide a clear separation of a set of variables associated with attack types and show that component-dominating parameters are crucial in monitoring future attacks.
Introduction
Anomaly intrusion detection deals with detection of unknown malicious traffic across networks which can be difficult to identify without planned intervention. Network administrators struggle to keep up with intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts, and often manually examine system logs to discover potential attacks. In recent years, data mining and machine learning techniques have widely been adopted within the network security community (Sommer & Paxson, 2010; Wu & Banzhaf, 2001 ) mainly due to the need for a greater understanding of the underlying intrusion detection rules in the Big Data Era (Suthaharan, 2014) . These developments have brought about both opportunities and challenges, requiring novel approaches to security design and modeling (Demchenko, Ngo, de Laat, Membrey, & Gordijenko, 2014; Kaufman, 2010) . While various tools, methods and techniques have been developed to deal with intrusion detection and ensure network security, gaps remain, apparently due to insufficient data sources on attacks on which to train and test intrusion detection algorithms. We propose a data-flow adaptive approach to intrusion detection based on high-dimensional cyberattacks data described in Section 3.1. Our approach derives from the original ideas in Lee, Stolfo, and Mok (2000) , Noel, Wijesekera, and Youman (2002) and Mitchell and Chen (2015) who laid down the general framework for domain-partitioning rule-based intrusion detection. In particular, Lee et al. (2000) applied association rules and frequent episodes from audit data for feature selection processes while Noel et al. (2002) combined association mining with classification. Both were driven by "the degree of confidence" associated with intrusion detectiona parameter that heavily relies on samples, hence a key challenge in knowledge extraction from data. This paper seeks to uncover the general intrusion behavior via multiple sampling. In particular, the paper focuses on dimensional reduction as discussed in Kambhatla and Leen (1997) , Maechler, Rousseeuw, Struyf, Hubert, and Hornik (2013) and Mardia, Kent Kent and Bibby (1979) and its main objectives are defined as follows.
(1) To uncover natural groupings in data traffic through multiple sampling and validation (2) To comparatively assess the emerging naturally arising groupings and (3) To propose a data-adaptive framework for future network intrusion detection
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines previous work relating to the overall behavior of intrusion and normal activities. It is followed, in Section 3, by the methods outlining the data sources and the adopted methods. Data analyses, results and discussions are in Section 4 and concluding remarks and recommendations in Section 5.
Background
Data sampling, randomness, multicollinearity, missing data and outliers are some of the main issues which data analysts have to deal with in their quest to attain modeling accuracy and reliability. Many have been widely studied and documentedsee, for instance, Mwitondi, Moustafa, and Hadi (2013) , Mwitondi, Taylor, and Kent (2002) and Mwitondi and Said (2013) . The need for flexible and adaptive security-oriented approaches to intrusion detection has triggered a growing interest in computational intelligence methodsartificial neural networks, fuzzy systems, evolutionary computation, artificial immune systems, swarm intelligence and soft computing (Wu & Banzhaf, 2001) . Identifying the most relevant features in intrusion detection is not confined to algorithmic computing as it depends much on existing expert domain knowledge skills and the way they are combined with automated tools.
Combining existing domain knowledge and automated learning techniques to solve the intrusion detection problems is generally attributed to the overall objective of data mining, i.e., knowledge extraction from data. Typically, frameworks for attaining that objective are based on pre-defined ontologies with inherently highly dynamic parameters. The dynamics of these parameters are encapsulated within the domains of unsupervised and supervised modeling for which many applications have been developed in recent years (Sommer & Paxson, 2010) . This paper builds upon some of the recent developments and it seeks to develop an integrated strategy to harmonizing inherent dynamics in modeling cyber-attacks.
Methods
Adopted methods fulfill the following key functions data understanding, cleansing, clustering and interpretation. More specifically, the paper explores a high-dimensional dataset for systematic characteristics of cyber-attacks. However, capturing and managing the dynamics of cyber-attacks constitute a fundamental challenge, not least because of inherent randomness in data, against the backdrop of which the study motivation and objectives are described.
Data sources
Potentially highly correlated data variables were generated from thousands of raw network packets of the UNSW-NB 15 created by the IXIA PerfectStorm tool in the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security. The dataset, created using 12 algorithms (Moustafa & Slay, 2015 , 2016 , represents a high-dimensional data which we denote by Ω ¼ x i;j ½τ i ¼ 1; 2; 3 . . . n; j ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . . p; 2 τ n (1) where n ¼ 82; 332 is the number of observations, p ¼ 27 is the number of variables and τ is the sample size randomly selected from Ω; with replacement. The dataset, the attributes of which and summary are shown in Figure 1 , represents 37,000 normal flowsalmost 45% of the total flow, and nine different types of malicous flows. Some of the variables on the left-hand side (LHS) panel derive from otherse.g., tcprtt is the sum of synack and ackdat and label is a binarized version of attacka.
Apparently, the multivariate data present an ideal case of multicollinearity. The right-hand side (RHS) panel exhibits nine malicious categories and one normal. The former takes two formsbinomial and multinomialforming a good data source for multiple sampling, training and testing. To fulfill the foregoing objectives, sampled subsets x i ½τ where τ is an indicator of sample sizes are extracted for natural grouping.
Modeling strategy
The samples are used to form natural groupings C iτ each with a notional probability π k ½τ such that P K k¼1 π k ½τ; where k ¼ 1; 2; . . . K is the number of groups and the p À dimensional probability function p x τ;j ; ω k À Á is fully described by the distributional parameters ω k . Throughout the samples, one parameter of interest is
whereẑ i;k ½τ is an indicator variable denoting membership to group k or otherwise and τ ¼ 1; 2; 3 . . . m is the sample number. Now, consider a case from a completely random traffic in which n a ¼ P n i¼1ẑ i;k ½τ is the total number of cases identified as malicious and n À n a ¼ P n i¼1 1 Àẑ i;k ½τ À Á : Given random sampling, a natural estimator for the average normal flow effect can be presented as the difference in the average outcomes of the cases identified as normal versus identified as malicious. The parameter of interest in Eq.
(2) leads to the expression in Eq. (3).
Since every sample is fixed, randomness only manifests in the componentẑ i;k ½τ and subsequently in τ / π k : Thus, the main idea of our strategy is that, by treating membership to these group proportions as missing data and repeatedly sampling and validating clusters, we characterize the overall behavior of cyber-intrusion. That is, given x τ as defined above, we can separate k groups with probabilities π k and π k corresponding to different descriptions of intrusion. Correlation analysis, principal component analysis (PCA) and kernel density estimation (KDE) are well-known conventional methods that can be applied to analyze the variations in Eq. (3). In particular, the KDE, defined aŝ
Þ¼1 is zero-centered and the key parameter β > 0 determines the number of emerging structures in the sample and therefore its optimal value is proportional to the variations between z i;k and 1 Àẑ i;k : Likewise, we can reduce the data dimension by generating uncorrelated new variables via PCA whereby each derived components are linear combinations of the original variables and ordered in accordance with variation they account for. For the n τ Â p matrix from each sample, we can compute matrix V which diagonalizes the covariance matrix Σ such that V À1 ΣV ¼ G; where G is a matrix of the eigenvalues of Σ The columns of V are orthorgonal to each other and they define the principal components whereas the diagonal values of G are the variances of the components. The orthogonal V are the eigenvectors, i.e., uncorrelated data with directions and magnitude defining each component.
As far as optimizing variation in data is concerned, β and eigenvalues play a similar role and so, in both cases, we can optimize their expected values via repeated sampling. For example, through each sample we can generate a correlation matrix that is re-ordered based on the angular order of the eigenvectors as defined in Eq. (5).
where e 1 and e 2 are the largest eigenvalues from the matrix. The mechanics for implementing the foregoing strategy in pursuit of the objectives outlined in Section 1 are presented in a finite number of steps in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm repeatedly takes up to m samples of different sizes, spacing and order from Ω: The magnitudes can be determined via exploratory analyses but the order is not particularly important. The algorithm's main idea is to compare variations in rotations the quantities which form the principal components.
Averaging of the variations may be confined to a few components contributing to the highest variation in data or may include all j ¼ p components.
Results and discussions
In this section, we present key results from implementing Algorithm 1 on data repeatedly sampled from Ω; as defined in Eq. (1) and described in Table 1 . As noted above, some of its key inputs such as sample sizes and spacing can be determined via exploratory analysis for insights into variable correlations, emerging natural structures and validation.
Preliminary analyses
The two panels in Figure 1 while μ m do 8: Output and interpret C m;i;j ½τ: 21: end procedure above. The RHS panel provides an ordered visual pattern that can be useful further analyses as in PCA below. Figure 1 exhibits two extreme cases of the variable correlations based on the number of observations. In both cases it is evident that the variables dpkts, dloss and dbytes are highly correlatedalmost perfectly positive. The same can be said of synack and tcprtt; tcprtt and ackdat as well as spkts, sloss, sbytes. While there are not many extreme cases of high correlation in the full dataset, samples drawn from it indicate high multicollinearity among the variables. Interpretation of principal components, discussed below, is preceded by computations of correlations between the original data for each variable and each extracted component. It is worth noting that interpretation of the principal components is based on finding the variables which most correlate with the components, as discussed below.
Extracting, interpreting and optimizing principal components
The panels in Figure 2 represent the same plot of the first two components from the full data labeled by all type of data flows on the left and by the binarized flow on the right. By the eigenvalue rule we can accept eight components which have a value greater than 1. The first eight components account for 81.34% of variation in the original data with the first through eighth accounting for 24.3%, 14.4%, 11.55%, 8.97%, 8.48%, 5.15%, 4.28% and 4.19% respectively. We see, on the LHS panel, that there is a clear separation of attributes that describe Exploits, Dos and Generic attack typesexhibited on the right as malicious and normal flows. That is, the first component strongly correlates with these variables as well as with normal flowincreasing with malicious and decreasing with normal flows. This suggests that the three attack types vary togetheri.e., as one goes up the other two tend to do the same. We can use the numerics associated with this component to measure and monitor the risk of these type of attacks.
Loadings of the first eight components from the full data are presented in Table 2 , where it can be seen that there is no single very high correlation between the variables and the extracted components. The magnitudes and directions of the loadings underline the existing multicollinearity among the data-flow variables which can also be explained by the large number of components extracted. These metrics represent the influence of the individual variables in constructing the component and, hence, by repeatedly sampling Figure 2 . Two panels of the same plot with multi-class and binary labeling. and extracting new components we generate a range of new metrics which can be aggregated and averaged in line with Algorithm 1. Particularly interesting are the variables which contribute to the highest variation in the datathese are the ones which are most highly correlate with extracted components. The two panels in Figure 3 show patterns generated by the full data and four different sample sizes. In both cases, the full dataset exhibits a predominantly positive contribution by most variables in forming the cluster but samples, large and small, exhibit both positive and negative relationships between the variables and the component exhibiting, in both cases, a clear binary pattern.
We can take a closer look at the structure of the componentsparticularly how its numerics can be used to measure and monitor attack risks. The prcomp in R returns a matrix of loadings, the columns of which contain the eigenvectors. Since each sample yields a different set of these values which occur in a subspace of the retained components and, as such, they are affected by the choice of the subspace. It is therefore reasonable to consider their descriptive statistics over different sample space sizes in order to attain robust interpretation of their role in forming the components. Key descriptive statistics taken from across 40 random samples for each of the 25 malicious flows are presented in Table 3 with a graphical illustration in Figure 4 . Note that most of the variables average above zero and only a handful rate, stll, sload and sinpkt take a below zero average which is in line with the upward trend in PC1 in Figure 2 .
The parameters used in constructing Table 3 and Figure 4 are proportional to the coefficients of the linear combination of the original variables in Table 1 . The linear combination makes up PC1 and, in this particular application, they impinge on the nature of the traffic and so they can be used as predictors of the phenomenon that they symbolize. The degree of influence of each variable in constructing the components can be deduced from both Tables 2 and 3 as well as from Figure 4 . As implied by Eq. (3), randomness manifests in sampling and, hence, in the calculation of τ / π k and it is in this sense that repeated sampling characterizes the overall behavior of cyber-intrusion.
Both the original full data and repeated samples exhibit a clear pattern of duality. The LHS panel in Figure 5 shows the densities of the full data and three random samples of sizes 50, 500 and 5,000 while the patterns on the right are proportional to the correlations between the individual variables and the first component across 40 samples.
The fact that no single variable exhibits significantly high correlation with the component in the RHS panel of Figure 5 highlights the potential masking of the flows. However, the fact that together the variables show a consistent separation of the data into two distinctive regions, with several variables such as dttl, sttl, dload, rate and dloss, standing out, implies that based on patterns and relationships from both the full data and multiple samples drawn from iti.e., given x τ as defined in Section 3.1, we can separate k groups with probabilities π k and π k corresponding to different descriptions of intrusion. More specifically, we can use historical data numerics associated with the first significant components, say, to train and test models to measuring and monitoring the risk of known types of intrusion.
Concluding remarks
We have presented a data-flow adaptive method for intrusion detection based on repeated sampling from a high-dimensional cyber-attack data source. We set off to achieve the three objectives in Section 1 from the premises of the two well-documented intrusion detection techniques misuse in Kumar and Spafford (1995) and anomaly detection (Porras & Neumann, 1997) . Our modeling interpretation of the former is that of rule-based decision that would help identify a suspicious behavior by comparing it to known catalogued malicious flows. On the other hand, the latter, as in many applications, was perceived as a model, the departure from which is a cause for alarm. We took a unified approach to the two and in both cases the binary and multi-class labels in the dataset used in the study provided the basis for such an approach. Table 3 from across 40 samples. Comparing the performance of our method of choice, PCA, with other dimensional-reduction techniques would have been ideal, but for the limitations imposed by the study objectives. However, we were able to demonstrate, via Algorithm 3.2, how information resulting from reduced data dimension of a large number of malicious flows, can be utilized to monitor the emerging structures and potentially be used as inputs in build robust IDSs. The results were achieved via repeated sampling, yielding parameters that were generally used to fine-tune potential structures in each sample. Aggregating the parameters over many runs, we were able to reproduce consistent patterns of the data duality. The resulting patterns render themselves readily to predictive modeling using the two class labels and therefore provide scope for extension into identifying new attacks. For that to happen, however, data attributes must always be added to the training and testing set repositories, not least because of the dynamic nature of intrusion. Novelty of our approach derives from iterative estimation of the roles played by individual variables in construction of components, particularly the potential for monitoring future attacks by focusing on the metrics that dominate the components. Without being influenced by the provided levels of attack types, our findings are particularly intriguing for two reasonsthe duality may mean either masking or swamping of attack types. That is, some currently unknown attack types may slip through as normal which is why it is imperative to highlight two important aspects of this studythe mechanics of the algorithm and the data attributes. If we knew the relevant density functions and classes of attack, we would simply observe data flows and make predictions. But in practice we have to estimate these parameters from random data and test our algorithms on another random dataset. Our contribution focused on variability as determined by z i ½τ and proportions π k . For continuous attributes, these parameters typically derive from the mean and covariance matrices of the normal mixtures while for categorical data, they are group proportions. Finally, our choice of the angular order of the eigenvectors was justified by the adopted dimensional-reduction methods used as it would make multiple comparisons to be made using other eigenvalues. There are other ways of re-ordering the correlation matrix to help visualization of the inherent patterns. This random nature of analytical studies stipulates that research be a function of data sharing, design, experimental setups and research findings. One way of achieving that goals is to go the way of open source repositories. We expect that this paper will contribute toward that aspiration, attain data enrichment, methods enhancements and open new paths to future studies.
